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Professor Sandel's purpose is "to bring out the truth" in the view 
that the "justice (or injustice) of laws against abortion and homosexual 
sodomy depends, at least in part, on the morality (or immorality) of 
those practices."' In particular, he wants to demonstrate that arguments 
against such laws cannot be carried entirely by a commitment to a "vol- 
untarist"2 perspective, which defends the right of individuals to choose to 
engage in certain practices, regardless of the moral character of those 
practices. Sandel's project is to illustrate the inadequacy of this perspec- 
tive through a critical analysis of "actual arguments"3 contained in 
recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court has developed the 
constitutional right to privacy, which protects from certain kinds of state 
interference such areas of life as abortion, procreation, marriage, and 
contraception. 
In this Comment I shall explore two problems with Professor 
Sandel's stimulating paper. The first is an important and suggestive 
ambiguity which lies at the heart of its exposition of the "voluntarist" 
perspective. The second is Sandel's seeming assumption that the dis- 
course of moral and political philosophy ought to be transposed tout 
court into the arena of constitutional adjudication. 
I 
THE VOLUNTARIST PERSPECTIVE 
A central target of Professor Sandel's paper is what he calls the 
"voluntarist view," which he describes as a theory that "government 
should be neutral among conceptions of the good life in order to respect 
the capacity of persons as free citizens or autonomous agents to choose 
their conceptions for themselves."4 Sandel traces a shift in Supreme 
t Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
1. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 CALIF. 
L. REV. 521, 521 (1989). 
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Court decisions involving the constitutional right to privacy. He charac- 
terizes the early cases, like Griswold v. Connecticut,s as reflecting a 
"traditional notion of privacy,"6 which embodies a "teleological" con- 
cern to affirm and protect "the social institution of marriage."7 He notes, 
however, that in its more recent cases the Court has turned instead to 
"voluntarist"' grounds for the protection of privacy, grounds which cele- 
brate the importance of individual choice. 
Focusing on the recent decision of Bowers v. Hardwick,9 Sandel 
identifies "two different ways" in which the question of whether "homo- 
sexual intimacies" should be "entitled to a constitutional right of pri- 
vacy" might be answered: "one voluntarist, the other substantive. The 
first argues from the autonomy the practices reflect, whereas the second 
appeals to the human goods the practices realize.""1 Professor Sandel 
deplores the fact that "of these two possible replies, the dissenters in 
Bowers relied wholly on the first."" In his view, the Bowers dissent 
reflects the Court's unfortunate recent turn toward voluntarism, with its 
concomitant privileging of individual choice, its ideal of "neutrality," 
and its rejection of "substantive moral discourse."•12 
For Sandel, the voluntarist view is associated with two distinct per- 
spectives: (1) an emphasis upon individual choice; and (2) a rejection of 
substantive moral discourse with a concomitant inattention to the evalu- 
ation of human goods.13 The difficulty is that these two perspectives do 
not necessarily entail each other. Indeed, although recent Supreme 
Court decisions have tended to privilege individual decisionmaking, they 
have also engaged in the substantive evaluation of human goods. 
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers perfectly illustrates this point. 
It is true that the dissent celebrates individual choice. It sets out to define 
"certain decisions that are properly for the individual to make"14 and 
that should therefore "be kept largely beyond the reach of govern- 
ment."'5 The dissent attempts to develop the theory that the Constitu- 
tion protects those specific kinds of personal decisions that are necessary 
for "an individual's self-definition."'6 It does so because it views "the 
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
6. Sandel, supra note 1, at 526. 
7. Id. at 527. 
8. Id. at 525. 
9. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
10. Sandel, supra note 1, at 534. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 522-23. 
13. Id. 
14. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun dissenting). 
15. Id. at 203 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 772 (1986)). 
16. Id. at 205. 
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'ability independently to define one's identity [as] central to any concept 
of liberty.' "17 The central thrust of the dissent is that identity-producing 
decisions are those which involve "the 'emotional enrichment [of] close 
ties with others.' "18 
The dissent, however, explicitly argues that such decisions should be 
protected because the power to make them is essential to the realization 
of a positive human values. The exercise of that power is indispensable 
"to the happiness of individuals" and to the "richness" of intimate "rela- 
tionships";'9 it is morally and practically necessary for the achievement 
of "a harmony in living."20 Individual choice in the matter of sexual 
partners is important, in other words, not because of the abstract virtue 
of autonomy, but because it is a prerequisite for the creation of "human 
goods." Thus while it may be fair to characterize the dissent as protect- 
ing individual choice, it is certainly not fair to charge it with evading 
substantive moral commitments. 
One can of course disagree with the dissent on these commitments; 
one can argue that personal happiness and harmony are inadequate 
grounds for constitutional decisionmaking, or that such happiness and 
harmony do not depend upon individual choice, or that they do not 
depend upon close sexual relationships. But it is evident that the dissent 
does attempt to make a moral argument about specific human goods, and 
so cannot fairly be accused of evading substantive moral judgment. In 
fact, by arguing that the capacity to make certain kinds of individual 
choices is necessary for the achievement of the human goods of happi- 
ness, harmony, and identity, and by using that argument as a basis to 
justify constitutional limitations on the power of the state to regulate cer- 
tain kinds of private behavior, the dissent appears to be engaging in pre- 
cisely the kind of "naive" view advocated by Sandel at the beginning of 
his paper.21 
So what, then, is troubling Professor Sandel? I suspect that the root 
of his concern lies in the fact that the Bowers dissent understands the 
relevant human goods to arise from the practice of choice, rather than 
from the practice of homosexual intimacy. Although this distinction is 
not relevant to the presence or absence of substantive moral discourse, it 
is relevant to the question of whether that discourse will reflect a concep- 
tion of persons as embedded within constitutive social practices or will 
instead reflect a conception of persons as independent and autonomous. 
I suspect that Sandel's real objection to the Bowers dissent, and indeed to 
17. Id. (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)). 
18. Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
21. Sandel, supra note 1, at 521. 
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the Court's more recent substantive due process decisions, is that they 
"redescribed the bearers of privacy rights from persons qua participants 
in ... social institution[s] ... to persons qua individuals, independent of 
their roles or attachments."22 
Sandel is of course quite correct to observe that many of the Court's 
recent right-to-privacy decisions have focused upon ahistorical individu- 
als, rather than upon persons who are part of traditional social institu- 
tions. The shift in the Court's focus is quite apparent from a doctrinal 
point of view. The Court's decisions regarding constitutional privacy are 
merely the most recent in a long line of cases that have developed the 
doctrine of substantive due process. That doctrine attempts to delineate 
the aspects of "liberty" which the due process clause will protect from 
state interference. The classic statement of the doctrine was by Justice 
Cardozo, to the effect that the due process clause protected those "princi- 
ples of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental."23 Substantive due process, in other words, 
classically examined the traditional and institutional bases for claims of 
immunity from government regulation. Justices Harlan and Goldberg 
addressed the issues posed in Griswold24 from within this doctrinal 
framework, which focused their attention, as Professor Sandel rightly 
notes, directly on "the social institution of marriage."25 
But this focus on tradition and institutions was strained by the 
Court's subsequent foray into the area of nonmarital sex.26 By the time 
the Court confronted the abortion cases, it had completely lost the ability 
to support its decision by reference to "the traditions and conscience of 
our people,"27 for the simple reason that abortion had for many years 
been proscribed virtually everywhere within the nation. To justify its 
conclusion in Roe28 that there was a constitutionally protected right to 
abortion, therefore, the Court was forced to stand classic due process 
doctrine on its head. It was required to articulate a justification for 
immunizing individuals from those government regulations that flowed 
precisely from the traditions and conscience of the people. 
The Court thus began to focus its analysis on those rights which 
individuals could assert to preclude even traditional government 
22. Id. at 527. 
23. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1933) (Cardozo, J., writing for the Court)). 
24. 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring and incorporating by reference his 
dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961)). Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
25. Sandel, supra note 1, at 527. 
26. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
27. Snyder, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933) quoted in Palko, 302 U.S. at 325, and in Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 487 (Goldberg J., concurring). 
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.131 on Sun, 9 Mar 2014 19:28:06 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1989] COMMENT ON SANDEL 557 
restraints. For obvious reasons, this analysis stressed the autonomy of 
individuals, rather than their dependence upon tradition and culture. It 
is this turn toward autonomy and choice that Professor Sandel rightly 
observes in his essay. What he fails to acknowledge, however, is that-as 
is often the case in the law-classic due process doctrine was never 
explicitly overruled. Although it receded from prominence, it neverthe- 
less retained its legitimacy.29 As a result we find that in the Bowers deci- 
sion the Court majority was able to invoke classic due process doctrine to 
argue that homosexual practices were not "deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition,"30 while the dissent was able to rely upon the 
Court's more recent cases to argue that such practices constitute the kind 
of "decisions that are properly for the individual to make."31 
The contrast between these doctrinal frameworks, of course, reso- 
nates deeply with Professor Sandel's famous critique of John Rawls, in 
which he faulted Rawls for conceiving of the self as detached and disem- 
bodied.32 In that critique Sandel eloquently demonstrated the inade- 
quacy of any individualism that postulates the self as totally independent 
of its community, tradition, and culture. We have learned from Profes- 
sor Sandel that the self precedes its own choices, and that it is in this way 
constituted by its community. It is no wonder, then, that Professor 
Sandel should be sympathetic to the doctrinal framework of Justice 
Harlan in Griswold, with its focus on social practices and institutions, for 
that framework represents precisely the kind of reflective self-discovery 
one might expect of a self embedded within a cultural tradition. 
Sandel's objection to the Court's recent voluntarist perspective may 
thus stem less from its lack of substantive moral discourse, than from its 
underlying conception of persons as independent of their roles and 
attachments. It is the Court's individualism that rankles, the fact that 
the Court conceives intimate relationships as entirely the product of per- 
sonal choice rather than of the institutions which are partly constitutive 
of the persons who participate within them. By shifting its focus from 
social practices to individual decisions, the Court's more recent doctrine 
effectively ignores those intersubjective "roles or attachments"33 which, 
on Sandel's view, are the crucible of moral identity. 
Even if one accepts Sandel's basic view of moral identity, however, it 
does not follow that the Court's recent doctrinal focus on individual 
choice is illegitimate. I do not understand Sandel to argue that the justice 
or injustice of regulating practices like homosexual sodomy depends 
29. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
30. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 192 (1986). 
31. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
32. M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
33. Sandel, supra note 1, at 527. 
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entirely on the moral status which such practices have traditionally been 
accorded. Thus even though the practice of homosexual sodomy has tra- 
ditionally been condemned, and even though a good many persons have 
incorporated into their identity negative attitudes toward that practice, 
Sandel properly regards the moral status of the practice as open to 
debate.34 Sandel hence appeals to a "substantive moral discourse" which 
is not confined to traditional attitudes and attachments. 
The theoretical foundation for such a discourse has been well 
explored by the American sociologist George Herbert Mead, who in the 
early years of this century advanced a sophisticated and complex view of 
the self as constituted by its social environment. Mead argued that the 
self can only exist by virtue of a linguistic competence which internalizes 
the values and attitudes of others. The self as a structure, as a personal- 
ity, Mead labelled the "me." But Mead also understood that the self 
cannot be reduced to the "me," for that would render the self totally 
passive and transparent. At any given moment individuals have the 
capacity to distance themselves from who they are, or who they have 
been made, and to reflect on these facts and perhaps even to change 
them. Mead labeled this capacity the "I," and he viewed the self as a 
process of interaction between the "I" and the "me." Any healthy self 
must have both an "I" and a "me," for it must simultaneously have 
shape and grounding in a specific culture and tradition, and yet be able to 
reflect on and criticize that tradition.35 
It follows from this perspective that an emphasis on individual 
choice-on the "I"-is not necessarily incompatible with a proper 
respect for the culture and tradition of the embedded self-the "me". In 
fact, we should expect in both our moral philosophy and our law a bal- 
ance between these two aspects of the self. Not surprisingly, that is just 
what we find in the contemporary doctrine of substantive due process. 
Older versions of the doctrine focus on and protect the "me," by safe- 
guarding from state interference the norms and values by which the 
social self has been constituted. More recent versions of the doctrine 
focus on and protect the "I," by offering individuals a clear and protected 
space to step back, evaluate, and perhaps differ from received moralities. 
Just as Professor Sandel would himself preserve a neutral space for a 
"substantive moral discourse" that can be critical of traditional attitudes, 
so the voluntarist focus which so disturbs him can be understood as an 
effort to secure the same protection for homosexuals to live and act in a 
manner critical of received traditions. 
There remains, of course, the decisive question of whether, in any 
particular case, the law should speak for the "I" or the "me"; whether it 
34. Id. at 536. 
35. G. MEAD, ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 226-40 (A. Strauss rev. ed. 1964). 
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should reinforce the claims of tradition and culture or instead defend the 
ability of individuals to differ from that culture. On that question I agree 
entirely with Professor Sandel: it all depends on an analysis of the specific 
issue, in all of its ramifications. But should the Court decide in any par- 
ticular case to defend individual choice, it would not necessarily follow 
that it was under the sway of an inaccurate and unduly narrow vision of 
the self. In any moderately complex legal system, just as in any moder- 
ately sophisticated person, we should expect a complicated process of 
exchange between the "I" and the "me," between the claims of individu- 
alism and those of community. This exchange cannot be encapsulated by 
any single decision, or even by any single line of decisions. To truly sup- 
port Sandel's charge that modern substantive due process law is unduly 
individualist, therefore, would require the assessment of a total pattern of 
decisions. 
II 
THE DISCOURSE OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRACTICE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 
This analysis, it should be noted, rests on a very different image of 
constitutional law than that which informs Professor Sandel's essay. 
Sandel's tendency is to read specific opinions as expositions of philosoph- 
ical positions, and he understands these positions to be generative of the 
law. He thus views judicial opinions as properly subject to full philo- 
sophical evaluation, as though judges were ersatz (and untrained) 
philosophers. 
I am suggesting, however, that it is important to examine what 
judges do as well as what they say, and that what they do is revealed in 
patterns of judgments. As substantive due process doctrine itself nicely 
illustrates, important questions of constitutional law generally bestride 
competing doctrinal positions that draw upon distinct philosophical per- 
spectives. The resulting ambiguities are characteristically used by judges 
to shape overall patterns of constitutional interventions. To uncover the 
philosophical perspectives that are actually generative of constitutional 
law, therefore, is as closely analogous to the problem of interpreting a 
series of actions, as it is to the challenge of interpreting a series of essays. 
Of course action and articulation are closely interrelated in the law. 
But they are not identical. The law, unlike philosophy, is an instrument 
of governance, a tool for the control of behavior. If the authority of phil- 
osophical discourse depends upon the persuasive force of its reasoning, 
the authority of law rests ultimately upon the power of the state. I viv- 
idly remember Robert Cover at a conference remarking on the question 
of why legal scholars pondered so carefully the words of then-Chief Jus- 
tice Burger. It was not, said Cover, because the Chief Justice was so deep 
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a thinker or so talented a writer, but because his judgments were 
enforced by the United States Army. His words were written, so to 
speak, in blood. In that very real sense, to decide a constitutional case is 
to assume the responsibility and obligations of action. 
What is at stake in a constitutional opinion, therefore, is very differ- 
ent from what is at stake in a philosophical discussion. It follows that 
the question of the regulation of private sexual practices will look very 
different to a moral philosopher, whose primary concern is to provide a 
convincing account of the ethical propriety of such regulation, than to a 
Supreme Court Justice, whose primary concern is to determine whether 
or not to strike down the regulation as unconstitutional. At times, how- 
ever, Professor Sandel writes as if the latter enterprise turns entirely on 
the former. He remarks, for example, that "The cure for liberalism is not 
majoritarianism, but a keener appreciation of the role of substantive 
moral discourse in political and constitutional argument."36 Likewise, in 
his closing pages, he defends this position because of "the extent to which 
constitutional discourse has come to constitute the terms of political dis- 
course in American public life."37 Professor Sandel apparently desires 
judges to speak more like moral philosophers. 
It may, however, be a mistake to advocate such a fusion of constitu- 
tional and moral discourse. Although it is fair to note the extent to 
which the former draws upon the latter, it is also important to recognize 
the extent to which constitutional discourse, as a form of action, has been 
fashioned in a manner designed to reduce possible abuses of power. Con- 
stitutional discourse is thus subject to a whole series of restraints, which 
are generally articulated in the language of "deference," "precedent," 
and so forth, which cut against the free play of moral reasoning. The 
nation sometimes suffers when these restraints are removed, as Franklin 
Roosevelt learned to his chagrin when the Court disabled his New Deal 
in the name of a constitutional discourse that drew heavily and without 
reservation upon moral presuppositions. 
This is not the time to address the particular constraints that ought 
to placed on constitutional discourse. The subject is immensely difficult 
and has consumed the best efforts of the past several generations of con- 
stitutional scholars. My only point is a simple one: The blending of ethi- 
cal, political, and constitutional discourse, which apparently forms the 
ideal of Professor Sandel's approach, may be neither a defensible nor 
desirable possibility for judicial decisionmaking. At the very least, a 
great deal of work needs to be done before that ideal can be taken as 
established. 
36. Sandel, supra note 1, at 522. 
37. Id. at 538. 
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